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This study aims to examine the relationship between police budget and killings by police. Using 
a panel data set of police budgets and police killings between 2013 and 2019, I estimate fixed 
effects models to explore the relationship of interest and use a Poisson conditional fixed effects 
model to examine the robustness of my results. For a given city-year, I find a statistically 
significant negative association between the proportion of city resources devoted to police 
resources and killings per 10,000 arrests, and between the Police Budget Per-Capita and killings 
per 10,000 arrests. I also find, for a given city-year, that the presence of an indicator variable 
proxying for the presence of an officer-worn body camera program is associated with additional 
Killings per 10,000 Arrests, and that this estimate is statistically different from zero. 
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The murder of George Floyd in May 2020 by Minneapolis Police Officer Derek Chauvin 
sparked international protest and widespread re-evaluation of the way policing is conducted in 
American cities (Wamsley, 2021). For the first time, the rallying cry to “Defund the Police” 
received mainstream attention as a solution to the problem of officer use of lethal force (King, 
2020). Proponents of defunding argue that resources cause more use of lethal force, while 
proponents of increasing funding reason that this funding can be invested in less-lethal methods 
of intervention like de-escalation training and accountability tools like body cameras. 
However, scholarly investigation of the relationship between funding and police violence 
is limited in the current literature. Most academic research on police violence has focused on the 
prevalence and demographic distribution of deadly use of force, and on the efficacy of non-lethal 
interventions. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the relationship between police 
killings and funding in 56 American cities between 2013 and 2019.  
I put together a panel data set of police killings and police budgets for this eight-year 
period and estimate fixed effects models to explore the relationship of interest. For a given city-
year, I find a statistically significant negative association between the proportion of city 
resources devoted to police resources and killings per 10,000 arrests. Furthermore, I find a 
statistically significant negative association between the Police Budget Per-Capita and killings 
per 10,000 arrests. I also find, for a given city-year, that the presence of an indicator variable 
proxying for the presence of an officer-worn body camera program is associated with additional 
Killings per 10,000 Arrests, and that this estimate is statistically different from zero. 
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2. Literature Review  
While ample research has been conducted on deadly use of force by police and the 
efficacy of non-lethal interventions, investigations of the specific relationship between funding 
and police violence are limited. There is some research to suggest that financial investment in 
policing can produce desirable results for the community. Evans & Owens (2006) find that 
police added to their departments by the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
program generated “statistically significant reductions in auto thefts, burglaries, robberies, and 
aggravated assaults.” However, broader research on the relationship between budget and Still, 
understanding the body of literature on deadly use of force by police and the efficacy of non-
lethal interventions is instrumental in exploring the effect of the proportion of a city’s budget 
devoted to police resources and these departments’ use of deadly force. The existing literature on 
deadly use of force, nonlethal strategies, and police funding is reviewed in this section. 
I.  Deadly Use of Force 
Law enforcement agencies have increasingly garnered public scrutiny for high-profile 
deadly uses of force on civilians in recent years (BBC, 2021). In reality, incidents where police 
use or threaten force are relatively rare–Hickman et al. (2009) estimates that this occurs in 1.7% 
of all contacts and in 20.0% of all arrests–but the dire consequences of choosing to employ 
deadly force necessitate careful investigation.  
A significant amount of research has examined situational factors that might influence 
use of force, including race of the citizen, race of the officer, and relative authority between 
citizen and officer. Tobit analyses conducted by Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) indicated that racial 
minorities experience greater risk of police killings. More recently, the Nix et al (2017) 
examination of 990 fatal police shootings, evaluating possible implicit bias, finds ied that white 
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civilians were significantly more likely than minority civilians to have been attacking at the time 
of the shooting, and that Black civilians were more than twice as likely as white civilians to have 
been unarmed at the time of the shooting. Alpert et al. (2004) established support for a 
relationship between level of force and officer race and found that police interactions with 
civilians were more likely to include greater force when the civilian appears to behave with less 
authority than the officer. 
Incidents of lethal force do not appear to be increasing over time in the United States–
using incident-level national data, Shane et al (2017) found that fatalities were stable across 
2015-2016, and established for the first time state-level base rates for fatal police shootings. 
More recently, independent organizations, such as Mapping Police Violence (2021) have 
aggregated nationwide statistics on incidents of lethal force, which may be leveraged to explore 
the dynamics of lethal use of force in greater depth. 
II.  Efficacy of Non-Lethal Interventions 
The tragic nature of lethal force–justified or unjustified–is largely undisputed, but there is 
no consensus on how this should impact funding. This section discusses the efficacy of less-
lethal methods of police intervention. 
a. De-Escalation Training 
In response to contentious use of force incidents, de-escalation training has been 
implemented in law enforcement agencies across the U.S. in recent decades. Preliminary studies 
have shown encouraging results, but further testing is required before a consensus can be 
reached. Engel et al’s (2020) evaluation of 64 de-escalation programs found that de-escalation 
training led to “slight-to-moderate” improvements at the individual and organizational level with 
few unfavorable consequences.  
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More recently, Goh’s (2021) case study of the effect of de-escalation training on use of 
force incidents a in a high-crime and high-poverty New Jersey city revealed that while de-
escalation training had no significant impact on use of serious force for individual officers, a 
department-wide synthetic control analysis de-escalation training led to a 40% reduction in 
incidents involving use of serious force. Goh concludes that de-escalation training has greater 
potential to reduce police use of force than other recently proposed measures, but cautions 
against extrapolation of this case-study to different environments. 
b. Body-Worn Cameras 
Use of body-worn cameras by law enforcement agencies has expanded quickly over the 
decade. Evidence suggests that these cameras are an effective tool for ensuring accountability on 
the part of law enforcement officers and reducing violence, corruption, and discrimination in the 
U.S. judicial system.  
In the world's first randomized controlled trial of police body-worn cameras, Ariel et al 
(2014) empirically tested the use of body-worn-cameras in a randomized control setting to 
determine their effect on both use of force and complaints against police. Results indicated that 
the likelihood of force being used in experimental conditions was approximately half that in the 
control setting. Similarly, the number of complaints filed against law enforcement officers was 
ten times lower in experimental conditions than in the control setting. Furthermore, the dollar 
benefit-to-cost ratio of employing this technology was estimated to be roughly 4:1, indicating 
that this is a reasonable expenditure. 
A follow-up study conducted by Sutherland et al (2017) revealed that the lower rates of 
both use of force and complaints against police described by Ariel et al were sustained during the 
following years. This indicates that officers do not respond to the presence of the cameras and 
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that the effects of the cameras on use of force and complaints against police may be enduring. In 
other words, this case study provides strong evidence of the long-term efficacy of body cameras 
in reducing serious use of force in civilian-officer interactions. 
A number of other case studies have been conducted that found similar results when 
evaluating the efficacy of body-worn cameras. Shane et al, discussed above, found similar 
results: the mean rate of fatalities was higher for officers not wearing a body camera when 
compared with those who did wear one. Jennings et al (2015) sought to evaluate the effect of 
police-worn body cameras on officers’ response to resistance and external officer complaints in a 
randomized control trial of Orlando Police Department officers. The results indicate that the 
prevalence of negative response to resistance incidents and the frequency of serious external 
complaints were significantly lower for officers randomly assigned to wear body cameras than 
for officers from the control group. 
III. Potential Militarization of Police 
On the other hand, proponents of decreasing police funding worry that additional funding 
could facilitate increased militarization of police forces, which have few benefits and have been 
shown to increase with use of deadly force. As noted by Mummolo (2018), militarized SWAT 
teams provide no identifiable benefits when considering violent crime reduction and officer 
safety, and are disproportionately deployed in minority communities. More concerning are the 
results of Delehanty et al (2017) and Kosliki et al (2021), which explore the relationship between 
police deadly force and the 1033 program, which transfers military surplus equipment to law 
enforcement agencies. Delehanty et al found a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between 1033 transfers and fatalities from officer-involved shootings at the county level from 
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four states. Kosliki et al examined 2973 agencies nationwide and found a moderate, positive 
relationship between the number of 1033 Program items obtained and fatal force.  
However, other research indicates less-alarming results of the 1033 Program. Harris et al 
(2014) investigate the effects of a department receiving tactical tools and weapons on citizen 
complaints, assaults on police officers, and offender deaths, finding that that these items 
generally have a positive impact. Among the most notable effects are “notably educed citizen 
complaints, reduced assaults on officers, increased drug crime arrests, and no increases in 
offender deaths (Harris et al, 2014).” 
IV. Police Budget Trends 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, state and local police budgets have steadily 
increased on average over the last two decades (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2020). Literature 
linking police budgets with other trends is limited, but not altogether absent. Zhao et al (2010) 
examined the local political culture, the nature of socioeconomic conditions, and the prevalence 
of incremental budget decision-making processes as the determinants of police budget allocation 
from municipal budgets and found that most of the variation in share of allocation to police 












I. Data Sources 
For my empirical analysis of the relationship between funding for city policy budgets and 
police killings, I combine data from two sources: Mapping Police Violence’s Police Killings 
Database and a hand-collected novel dataset of city-level police budget information. 
a. Police Killings Dataset 
Data on police killings were retrieved from Mapping Police Violence’s Database 
(Referred to hereafter as the Police Killings Dataset), which includes 9,038 observations between 
2013 and 2021. The information in this database was aggregated from three large, 
comprehensive, databases: FatalEncounters.org, the U.S. Police Shootings Database and 
KilledbyPolice.net into a list of individual killing victims (About the Data, 2021). MPV 
independently collected additional data from social media, obituaries, criminal records databases, 
police reports and other sources to contribute additional demographic information to its database 
(About the Data, 2021). Variables will be defined more specifically in the Final Dataset section. 
The database also aggregates killings by Police Department for the 101 relevant 
American cities. This alternative aggregate set includes the sum of all killings between 2013 and 
2021 with breakdowns by race and whether the killing was recorded by an officer-worn body 
camera. Also included are a count of the violent crimes and a count of the total arrests for each 
city for each year from 2013 to 2019, as well as the total population (Census ACS 5 Year 2018) 
for each city (About the Data, 2021). 
This study utilizes the following information from the MPV database: date and location 
of the incident, race of the deceased, whether or not the killing was recorded by an officer-worn 
body camera, the violent crime count and the total arrest count for each city-year, the Census 
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ACS 5 Year 2018 population for each city. These data were either incorporated into my 
regression models outright or transformed into the appropriate variables as outlined in the 
Finalized Dataset section. 
b. Budget Dataset 
A dataset containing the relevant budget information for selected cities was not readily 
available, so I hand-collected a novel dataset for the purposes of this study. I perused the website 
of the financial department of each city listed in the MVP dataset and used city budget books to 
collect budget measures of interest. I attempted to use the full adopted city budget books 
wherever available, but many cities did not include this version of the budget. Examples of 
alternative documents I used to obtain yearly budget measures include the proposed budget for 
each year, the city council’s recommended budget, and various budgets-in-brief. Additionally, 
since city budget documents are not standardized, there was considerable variation in how 
budgets were presented. This was particularly challenging when budgets were not aggregated by 
departmental allocation. In collecting the budget measures, I prioritized consistency of measures 
across time within a city, even if the data reflect some minor differences across cities. 
The budget measures of interest are the Total City Budget in Dollars and the Police 
Department Budget in Dollars. Where available, the All Funds Grand Total figures were used for 
Total City Budget. Where All Funds Grand Total figures were not available, General Fund 
Grand Total figures were used instead. Corresponding figures were used for the Police 
Department budgets: For cities where All Funds Grand Total figures were available, full Police 
Departmental budgets were used and for cities where only General Fund Grand Total figures 
were used, the portion in dollars of the police budget that came from the General Fund was used. 
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Rarely did these figures differ significantly–for most cities, the police budget came primarily or 
exclusively from the general fund. 
c. Finalized Dataset 
Data from the Police Killings Dataset and the Budget Dataset were combined in a panel 
dataset of 51 cities by city-year between 2013 and 2019 including the following variables: 
• Year: Fiscal years assigned to calendar years. Retrieved from the Police Killings Dataset. 
• Killings: The number of killings of people by police per calendar year, where a killing is 
defined as “A case where a person dies as a result of being shot, beaten, restrained, 
intentionally hit by a police vehicle, pepper sprayed, tasered, or otherwise harmed by 
police officers, whether on-duty or off-duty” (About the Data, 2021). Retrieved from the 
Police Killings Dataset. 
• City Budget: Measured in USD, retrieved directly from the Budget Dataset 
• Police Budget: Measured in USD, retrieved directly from the Budget Dataset 
• Budget Ratio: The ratio of the Police Budget to the City Budget for each city-year 
• Crime Rate: Calculated as the number of violent crimes per city-year divided by the city 
population, both from the Police Killings Dataset. 
• Body Cam: A binary variable that indicates whether at least one killing by a given police 
department in a given year was witnessed by an officer-worn body camera, based on the 
Police Killings Dataset. Used as a proxy for whether or not a police department has a 
body camera program in a given year. 
• Killings per 10,000 Arrests: Count of killings per city-year divided by the count of arrests 
per city-year times 10,000. 
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• Percent Black: The annual Black population of each city as a proportion of the Census 
ACS 5 Year 2018 population, both retrieved from the Police Killings Dataset. 
• Arrest Count: A count of arrests for each city-year, retrieved from the Police Killings 
Dataset. 
• Violent Crime Count: A count of violent crimes reported for each city-year, retrieved 
from the Police Killings Dataset.       
II. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics across all city-years for the variables of interest–in 
particular, those used in the regressions and those used to compute the variables used in the 
regressions. The high standard deviations for most of these variables indicates a large degree of 
variation within the data. Therefore, it will be helpful to investigate select variables on their own 
over time. In particular, I will examine the variables that measure budget and killings. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Killings 2.595982 3.231512 0 23 
City Budget (USD) 1620000000 210000000 86000000 17800000 
Police Budget (USD) 222000000 288000000 33200000 1780000000 
Budget Ratio .192788    .1267217   .0522945   .6444833 
Crime Rate 11.24335    14.70446    .287926   77.73237 
Body Cam .2008929     .401116          0 1 
Killings per 10,000 Arrests 1.510522 1.490368          0 8.316008 
Percent Black .1919492    .1631461   0093404 .6396392 
Arrest Count 19278.95 17060.67 2064     112862 
Violent Crime Count 4412.586 5770.943 207778    3959657 
Police Budget Per-Capita 336.5074 139.7574   118.1695   1457.574 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Variables of Interest Across City-Years 
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a. Variation in Budget Over Time 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the average Police Budget has strictly increased over time, with 
few exceptions even amongst individual cities. However, this growth has been notably outpaced 
by increases in the average City Budget, which has increased nearly nine times as quickly. 

















Figure 1. Average City and Police Budget for all cities, 2013-2019.  
















Figure 2. Average budget ratio of all cities, 2013-2019 
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Figure 2 shows that budget ratio has decreased on average between 2013 and 2019. Fort 
Worth, Tucson, and Scottsdale had the largest budget ratios, all averaging above 0.5. Fort Worth 
saw some fluctuation, Tucson trended upwards, and Scottsdale trended downwards. Denver, 
Seattle, St. Paul, Raleigh, and Chesapeake had the lowest budget ratios, averaging below 0.07. 
Denver and Raleigh trended down over time while Seattle trended up. St. Paul trended up 
negligibly, while Chesapeake trended up negligibly. 
b. Variation in Killings Over Time 
 
Figure 3 shows that, on average for all cities, the count of killings has decreased between 
2013 and 2019. Cities with a lower count of killings do not appear to reliably trend up or down 
over time-in killings per year appear to change sporadically. Cities with the largest count of 
killings, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston, appear to trend towards fewer killings over time. 



















Figure 3. Average count of killings for all cities, 2013-2019




Figure 4 reveals that the average Killings per 10,000 Arrests for all cities, by contrast, has 
remained more steady. While there was some fluctuation between 2013 and 2019, at a jump up 
to high of nearly 1.8 in 2016, the average began and ended in nearly the same pattern: a decrease 








































Figure 4. Average Killings per 10,000 Arrests for all cities, 2013-2019
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4. Empirical Strategy & Results 
I. Models 
a. Fixed-Effects Model 
I estimate fixed-effects models using the following specification: 
 
Yit = α + βXit+ ψi+ γt+ εit 
 
where Yit is a measure of killings per 10,000 arrests per city-year, Xit is a vector of city-year 
characteristics, ψi  represents city fixed effects and γt represents year fixed-effects, i denotes 
individual city, t denotes time, and ε is an error term with the usual properties. 
In this model, city fixed effects are controlling for time-invariant factors that explain 
variation in police cities across cities, and year fixed effects are controlling for national time-
varying shocks that explain variation in police killings over time. 
b. Conditional Fixed-Effects Poisson Model 
I estimate conditional fixed-effects Poisson models using the following specification: 
 
Zit = α + βXit+ ψi+ γt+ εit 
 
where Zit is count of killings per city-year, Xit is a vector of city-year characteristics, ψi 
represents city fixed effects and γt represents year fixed-effects, i denotes individual city, t 
denotes time, and ε is an error term with the usual properties. 
 




Two measures of police budget are examined in the following regressions: Budget Ratio, 
which measures the proportion of a city’s budget devoted to police resources, and Police Budget 
Per-Capita. Since the Annual Crime Rate was only obtainable for the years 2013-2019, the 
number of observations drops from 448 to 355. The first set of regressions utilized the fixed 
effects model. 
When Killings per 10,000 Arrests is regressed onto Budget Ratio with controls for 
Annual Crime Rate and an indicator variable proxying for the presence of a Body Camera 




β Robust Standard 
Error 
t P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Budget Ratio  -3.138539  1.741097  -1.80 0.077  -6.627775  .3506966 
Crime Rate -.0277546  .021431  -1.30  0.201 -.0707032 .015194 
Body Cam  .7722249 .2246896  3.44  0.001 .321937 1.222513 
 
Table 2. Fixed-Effects Regression of Killings Per 10,000 Arrests onto Budget Ratio, Crime Rate, and 
Body Cam 
 
 A one standard deviation (0.13) increase in Budget Ratio is associated with a decrease of 
0.4 Killings per 10,000 Arrests. This relationship is statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level, so we can reject the null hypothesis. This is nearly a quarter of the average 
number of Killings per 10,000 Arrests (1.510522).   
Each percentage point increase in annual crime rate is associated with 0.028 fewer 
killings per 10,000 arrests. This relationship is not statistically significant, so we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis.  
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The Body Camera indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of a Body Camera program 
in a given city-year, is associated with 0.77 more Killings per 10,000 arrests. This relationship is 
statistically different from 0 at the 0.1% significance level, so we can reject the null hypothesis.  
When Killings per 10,000 Arrests is regressed onto Police Budget Per-Capita with 
controls for Annual Crime Rate and an indicator variable proxying for the presence of a Body 
Camera Program, the results in Table 3 were obtained. The directionality of each relationship 




β Robust Standard 
Error 
t P > 
|t| 
95% Confidence Interval 
Police Budget 
Per-Capita 
-0.0006641 0.0002748 -2.42 0.019  -0.0012149 -0.0001133 
Crime Rate -0.0273122 0.0213557 -1.28 0.206 -0.0701099  0.0154856 
Body Cam 0.7724753  0.2240927 3.45 0.001  0.3233836   1.221567 
 
Table 3. Fixed-Effects Regression of Killings Per 10,000 Arrests onto Police Budget Per-Capita, 
Crime Rate, and Body Cam 
 
A $100 increase in Police Budget Per-Capita is associated with a 0.066 decrease in 
Killings per 10,000 arrests. This relationship is statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level, so we can reject the null hypothesis. 
Each percentage point increase in annual crime rate is associated with 0.027 fewer 
killings per 10,000 arrests. However, this relationship is not statistically significant, so we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis.  
The Body Camera indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of a Body Camera program 
in a given city-year, is associated with 0.77 more Killings per 10,000 arrests when compared 
with no Body Camera program. This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1% 
significance level, so we reject the null hypothesis.  
DEFUND THE POLICE? 
 
21 
To explore the robustness of my results, I estimate a second model using the number of 
killings as the outcome variable. Because this variable is a count, I employ a Poisson regression. 
Results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
Killings β Robust 
Standard Error 
t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Budget Ratio -4.244864 2.985286 -1.42  0.155  -10.09592 1.606189 
Violent Crime 
Count 
-0.0000134 0.0000133 -1.01 0.314 -0.0000395 0.0000127 
Arrest Count 3.83 • 10-6 4.32 • 10-6 0.89 0.376 -4.64 • 10-6 0.0000123 
Body Cam 0.2758518 0.1097731  2.51 0.012 0.0607004 0.4910032 
 
Table 4. Poisson Conditional Fixed-Effects Regression Killings of onto Budget Ratio, Violent Crime 
Count, Arrest Count, and Body Cam 
 
The results from the Poisson model regressing Killings on Budget Ratio, Violent Crime 
Count, Arrest Count, and Body Camera Indicator, shown in Table 4 were consistent in direction 
with the results obtained from the fixed effect model: The relationships between Budget Ratio 
and Killings and between Violent Crime Count and Killings are both negative. The relationship 
between the Body Camera indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of a Body Camera program 
in a given city-year, and Killings was positive. The relationship between Arrest Count and 
Killings was also positive, but only just. 
Killings β Robust 
Standard Error 
t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Police Budget 
Per-Capita 
-0.0007485 0.0013244 -0.57 0.572 -0.0033444 0.0018474 
Violent Crime 
Count 
-0.0000104 0.0000125 -0.84 0.404 -0.0000349 0.000014 
Arrest Count 3.97 • 10-6 4.24 • 10-6 0.94 0.348 -4.33 • 10-6 0.0000123 
Body Cam 0.282115 0.1098225  2.57 0.010 0.0668668 0.4973631 
 
Table 5. Poisson Conditional Fixed-Effects Regression of Killings onto Police Budget Per-Capita, 
Violent Crime Count, Arrest Count, and Body Cam 
 
The results were similarly consistent for the Poisson model regressing Killings on Police 
Budget Per-Capita, Violent Crime Count, Arrest Count, and Body Camera Indicator, shown in 
DEFUND THE POLICE? 
 
22 
Table 4. The relationships between Police Budget Per-Capita and Killings and between Violent 
Crime Count and Killings are both negative. The relationship between the Body Camera 
indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of a Body Camera program in a given city-year, and 
Killings was positive. The relationship between Arrest Count and Killings was also very slightly 
positive. 
I also estimated the fixed-effects models separately for cities above and below the median 
Percent Black (0.138) in order to investigate how these variables trended in areas with lower and 
higher Black populations. The first subset of regressions was estimated for cities with a Black 
population percentage above the median for all cities: one regression using the budget ratio and 
another using the per capita police budget. A second subset of regressions was estimated for 
cities with a Black population percentage above the median for all cities: one regression using 
the budget ratio and another using the per capita police budget. Note that the sample size for the 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Budget Ratio -2.187972 1.552236 -1.41 0.170 -5.372896 0.9969533 
Crime Rate -0.0413957 0.0405548 -1.02  0.316  -0.1246073 0.0418159 
Body Cam 0.6094219 0.3184312 1.91  0.066 -.0439448 1.262789 
 
Table 6. Fixed-Effects Regression of Killings per 10,000 Arrests for cities above the median Percent 
Black onto Budget Ratio, Violent Crime Count, Arrest Count, and Body Cam 
When Killings per 10,000 Arrests is regressed onto Budget Ratio with controls for 
Annual Crime Rate and Body Camera indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of a Body 
Camera program in a given city-year, for cities with a Black population percentage above the 
median Percent Black, for all cities, the results in Table 6 were obtained. 
A one standard deviation (0.131) increase in Budget Ratio is associated with a decrease 
of 0.412 Killings per 10,000 Arrests. Each percentage point increase in annual crime rate is 
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associated with 0.0414 fewer killings per 10,000 arrests. However, neither relationship is 
statistically significant, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 The Body Camera indicator is associated with 0.609 more Killings per 10,000 arrests. 
This relationship is statistically different from zero at the 10% significance level, so we can 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Budget Ratio -5.333511 4.408506 -1.21 0.237 -14.37902 3.711996 
Crime Rate -0.0229474 0.0243598 -0.94  0.355 -0.0729295 0.0270348 
Body Cam 1.015747 0.3421556 2.97 0.006 0.3137021 1.717793 
 
Table 7. Fixed-Effects Regression of Killings per 10,000 Arrests for cities below the median Percent 
Black onto Budget Ratio, Violent Crime Count, Arrest Count, and Body Cam 
When Killings per 10,000 Arrests is regressed onto Budget Ratio with controls for 
Annual Crime Rate and Body Camera indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of a Body 
Camera program in a given city-year, for cities with Black population percentage below the 
median for all cities, the results in Table 7 were obtained. 
 A one standard deviation (0.127) increase in Budget Ratio is associated with a decrease 
of 0.676 Killings per 10,000 Arrests. When compared with the regression of cities above the 
median Percent Black, this indicates that the strength of this correlation is stronger in areas with 
a lower Black population. Each percentage point increase in annual crime rate is associated with 
0.0229 fewer killings per 10,000 arrests. However, neither relationship is statistically significant, 
so we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 The Body Camera indicator is associated with 1.02 more Killings per 10,000 arrests. This 
is just under twice the number of killings associated with the presence of a body program than 
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for cities with a Black population percentage above the median. This estimate is statistically 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Police Budget 
Per-Capita 
-0.0005106 0.0002565 -1.99 0.057 -0.0010369 0.0000156 
Crime Rate -0.0397666 0.0400022 -0.99 0.329 -0.1218443 0.0423111 
Body Cam 0.6140262 0.3170436 1.94 0.063 -0.0364934 1.264546 
 
Table 8. Fixed-Effects Regression of Killings per 10,000 Arrests for cities above the median Percent 
Black onto Police Budget Per-Capita, Violent Crime Count, Arrest Count, and Body Cam 
When Killings per 10,000 Arrests is regressed onto Police Budget per Capita with 
controls for Annual Crime Rate and Body Camera indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of 
a Body Camera program in a given city-year, for cities with Black population percentage above 
the median for all cities, the above results were obtained.  
A $100 increase in Police Budget Per Capita is associated with a 0.0511 unit decrease in 
Killings per 10,000 arrests. Each percentage point increase in annual crime rate is associated 
with 0.0398 fewer killings per 10,000 arrests. However, neither relationship is statistically 
significant, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis for these variables.  
The Body Camera indicator is associated with 0.614 more Killings per 10,000 arrests when 
compared with no Body Camera program. This relationship is statistically different from zero at 
the 10% significance level, so we reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 







t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Police Budget 
Per-Capita 
-0.0017099  0.006172 -0.28 0.784 -0.0143739 
 
0.010954 
Crime Rate -0.0240303 0.0249121 -0.96 0.343 -0.0751458 0.0270851 
Body Cam 1.026326 0.3604256 2.85 0.008 0.2867939 1.765858 
 
Table 9. Fixed-Effects Regression of Killings per 10,000 Arrests for cities below the median Percent 
Black onto Police Budget Per-Capita, Violent Crime Count, Arrest Count, and Body Cam 
When Killings per 10,000 Arrests is regressed onto Police Budget per Capita with controls 
for Annual Crime Rate and Body Camera indicator, used as a proxy for the presence of a Body 
Camera program in a given city-year, for cities with a Black population percentage below the 
median for all cities, the above results were obtained.  
A $100 increase in Police Budget Per Capita is associated with a 0.171 unit decrease in 
Killings per 10,000 arrests. This is more than twice the magnitude than that of cities with a Black 
population percentage above the median for all cities. Each percentage point increase in annual 
crime rate is associated with 0.0240 fewer killings per 10,000 arrests. However, neither 
relationship is statistically significant, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis for these variables.  
The presence of a Body Camera program in a given city is associated with 1.026 more 
Killings per 10,000 arrests when compared with no Body Camera program-and again, more than 
twice the magnitude than that of cities with a Black population percentage above the median for 








I. Discussion of Results & Limitations 
This study found statistically significant evidence that an increase in the proportion of a 
city’s budget devoted to police resources is associated with a lower number of Police Killings 
per 10,000 Arrests. Furthermore, it found statistically significant evidence that an increase in the 
police budget per capita is associated with a lower number of Police Killings per 10,000 Arrests. 
It is important to note that these findings do not establish a causal relationship between killings 
and budget, so the directionality is unclear. While it is possible that increased spending results in 
fewer killings, the reverse–that funding is increased in response to fewer killings–could also hold 
true. Furthermore, this association could be explained by other variables not included in the 
study. 
Interestingly, the study also found statistically significant evidence that an indicator 
variable proxying for the presence of a Body Camera program in a given city-year is associated 
with increases in the number of Police Killings per 10,000 Arrests across all specifications. Since 
these findings do not establish a causal relationship between these variables, the direction of 
causality of this relationship is unclear. The relationship could indicate that the presence of a 
body camera emboldens officers to engage in risk-taking behavior, but the relationship could just 
as easily run in reverse: perhaps cities where law enforcement work is dangerous invest in body 
cameras because they anticipate violent conflict and seek accountability and objectivity. 
Furthermore, it’s possible that this relationship could be explained by a variable that’s been 
omitted from the study. 
 Lack of data availability was a notable obstacle in this study. Additional cities (up to the 
101 included in the Police Killings Dataset) could have been included in the regression if budget 
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information was more readily available. Unfortunately, many cities have not digitized their 
financial records as far back as 2013, and those that have been digitized are not standardized. 
Launching inquiries into the financial departments of individual cities is labor-intensive and 
time-consuming. However, if the timeline of this project were expanded, this outreach might be 
worthwhile to obtain a more complete dataset. 
Furthermore, the list of killings in the MVP Dataset, while more complete than other 
datasets, is not exhaustive. For example, the 2019 fatal shooting of Miles Hall in Walnut Creek, 
CA, is nowhere to be found despite ongoing media and legal attention (Mukherchee, 2021).  
II. Suggestions for Further Study 
As previously suggested, further research into the relationship between the presence of a 
body camera program and the number of Police Killings per 10,000 Arrests is recommended. 
While a binary variable accounting for the presence of a body camera program was included in 
this study, it was not its central focus. Designing a study around this variable and specifically 
considering the factors that might influence this relationship will likely produce more valuable 
insights. 
The poverty level of poverty and how it is addressed cities may also have a relationship 
with police killings. Adding variable(s) to account for the poverty level in cities in the dataset 
would be interesting. Potential variables might include median income or the proportion of the 
population living below the poverty line. While it may require additional novel data collection, 
this data should be readily available and this seems to be a reasonable extension of the current 
study. 
The education level of involved officers may have a relationship with police killings. 
This could include formal education (for example, High School Diploma vs. 4-year degree) or 
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specialized training completed during tenure (for example, de-escalation training). This kind of 
data would likely be difficult to gather, as police departments tend to be protective of identifying 
information about officers involved in killings (Friedersdorf, 2014). Standardization of training 
may differ department-to-department as well, which makes this sort of education difficult to 
quantify. These obstacles make incorporating these variables difficult. Nevertheless, including 
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